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This paper presents both analytics and numerical simulation results relevant to proposals for carbon
motivated regional trade agreements summarized in Dong & Whalley(2008). Unlike traditional regional
trade agreements, by lowing tariffs on participant’s low carbon emission goods and setting penalties
on outsiders to force them to join such agreements , carbon motivated regional trade agreements reflect
an effective merging of trade and climate change regimes, and are rising in profile as part of the post
2012 Copenhagen UNFCC negotiation. By adding country energy extraction cost functions, we develop
a multi-region general equilibrium structure with endogenously determined energy supply. We calibrate
our model to business as usual scenarios for the period 2006-2036. Our results show that carbon motivated
regional agreements can reduce global emissions, but the effect is very small and even with penalty
mechanisms used, the effects are still small. This supports the basic idea in our previous policy paper
that trade policy is likely to be a relatively minor consideration in climate change containment.
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1.   Introduction 
This paper presents both analytics and numerical simulation results relevant to 
recent debate on carbon motivated regional trade agreements (see Chatham House 
(2007) and Dong & Whalley (2008)). Proposals which circulate include explicitly 
lowering or eliminating tariffs among parties to a regional agreement on low carbon 
intensive goods and products used in low carbon technologies,border adjustments on 
trade with parties outside the area based on differential emissions content of goods, 
and the use of trade sanctions against countries outside the area to enforce compliance 
with emissions reduction targets set for them. Such proposals reflect an effective 
merging of trade and climate change regimes, and are rising in profile as part of the 
post 2012 Copenhagen UNFCC negotiations (See Walsh & Whalley (2008), and 
Lockwood & Whalley(2008)). Here we discuss carbon motivated regional agreements 
in terms similar to customs union and regional trade agreements based literature (See 
Viner(1950)) .   
    We note that agreements with lower within-region barriers on low carbon 
intensive products need not reduce emissions globally if emissions intensities of 
production differ sharply within and inside the region. This reflects the differential 
impact of trade creation and trade diversion on emissions. We also note that unlike 
conventional customs union literature the welfare effects of a regional agreement now 
also include welfare impacts on climate change from emissions changes. 
 We use a multi-region general equilibrium structure in which countries produce 
commodities of varying emissions intensities using substitutable fossil fuel based 
energy and non-energy inputs. Commodities are differentiated by country of origin 
following Armington (1969). Preferences are defined over both consumption of goods 
and climate change, with lower utility from higher global temperature change. 
 Unlike in conventional trade models in which there is a fixed endowment of 
factor inputs for each country, here we model energy supply globally as integrated 
with a single global market and price, and there being a supply function for each 
country reflecting increasing extraction costs. We do not separately differentiate - 4 - 
between fossil and non fossil fuels, but in a further model extension we could do so. 
We model the extraction cost function in constant elasticity form to yield a 
specification consistent with alternative values of the supply elasticity of energy. We 
then treat emissions in each country as fixed coefficient in energy use, and in this way 
incorporate endogeneity of emissions levels. Global emissions levels can thus rise or 
fall under any given regional trade agreement. This differs from other equilibrium 
structures, (see OECD(1993),Bhattacharyya(1996) and Wing(2004) ) in which the 
energy endowment is fixed (perfectly inelastic supply). 
We next turn to numerical simulation, and using a number of data sources 
construct a benchmark global equilibrium data set based on data for 2006. This covers 
production, consumption and trade for each of a number of regions (US, EU, China, 
ROW) which we then project forward using 2004-2006 average growth rates for the 
period 2006-2036. In our static equilibrium model we thus treat the thirty year period 
2006-2036 as a single period. The data set also contains estimates of energy use by 
sector and emissions for 2006 which are growth rate projected forward for period 
2006-2036. We calibrate our model to this data set using literature based estimates of 
key elasticities. 
   Results from our analysis support the conjecture made verbally in our previous 
policy paper (see Dong & Whalley (2008) ) that carbon motivated trade policies such 
as carbon free trade areas can only have a relatively small role in reducing carbon 
emissions. Carbon motivated regional agreements may increase world welfare, but the 
effects on participating countries may be negative or positive, when with penalties, 
the effect of carbon motivated trade policies on carbon emissions is still small. 
Though the carbon motivated regional agreements will have larger effects with 
emissions of high and low emissions intensities countries involved, the effects are still 
small. - 5 - 
2.  Relevant  Literature  and  Model  Structure 
2.1  Literature Review 
Discussion of both the form and impact of carbon free trade agreements is 
related to the long studied customs union issue originally analyzed by Viner (1950). 
Viner, the initiator of subsequent customs union literature, pointed out that regional 
trade agreements do not necessarily result in gains to members, even though bilateral 
tariffs are eliminated by the agreement. He developed what later became known as the 
trade creation – trade diversion approach to regional trade agreements to help 
understand this ambiguity. Following Viner’s work, for many years trade creating 
regional agreements were seen as good, and trade diverting regional agreements were 
seen as bad. 
Viner’s work was also the driving force behind later literature that subsequently 
sought to set out the conditions under which regional trade agreements would either 
improve or worsen welfare. This work was still based on trade creation—trade 
diversion considerations, but Meade (1955), Lipsey(1957) and others discovered that 
preference considerations also enter in trying to make such determinations. This was 
to lead to Lipsey and Lancaster’s (1956) characterization of the general theory of the 
second best, confirmation that no general customs union results were possible. 
Dissatisfaction with the trade creation – trade diversion dichotomy resulted in Lipsey 
(1970), Kemp(1969), Riezman(1979) and others trying to develop other approaches 
that would yield clear propositions. The approach known as the terms of trade-volume 
of trade approach became popular, under which the impact of a regional trade 
agreement can be summarized by its effects on both terms of trade (prices) and trade 
volumes. Most traditional literature on regional trade agreements falls into the 
traditional Vinerian framework.   
In Dong & Whalley(2008), we proposed three different forms of possible carbon 
motivated regional trade arrangements. One is regional trade agreements with varying 
types of trade preferences towards low carbon intensive products, low carbon new 
technologies and inputs to low carbon processes being used to stimulate trade (and - 6 - 
hence consumption) in low carbon intensive products. In this way they are designed to 
contribute directly to emissions reduction through changed trade patterns. A second 
type focuses on the anti-competitive effects on domestic producers when significant 
joint emissions reduction commitments are made which others do not follow. Such 
commitments raise costs for domestic producers and whether there should be offsets 
for these relative cost effects compared to third country producers operating outside of 
such arrangements is an issue, as well as the form they should take. The perceived 
need for border tax adjustments had already arisen in Europe who saw themselves as 
going father and faster on emissions reductions than partner countries. A third type of 
arrangement could be where countries enter into free trade or other regional trade 
agreements and use joint and discriminatory carbon motivated trade barriers against 
third parties as a way of pressuring countries to join their joint environmental 
agreement. This form of trade arrangement is similar to that contained in the Montreal 
Protocol of 1987. 
 This paper follows Dong & Whalley (2008), and numerically evaluates the 
economic effects of type one and type three carbon free trade areas in that paper. In 
their simplest form, carbon free trade areas would involve free trade in low carbon 
containing products among countries jointly committing to significant emissions 
reductions or renewable commitments, and also with external trade barriers against 
third countries that do not follow. Discussion of both their form and impact is related 
to the long studied customs union issue originally analyzed by Viner(1950), but now 
there are also impacts of carbon pricing/reduction policies on emissions via 
endogenous energy supply. The paper focuses on two departures from Vinerian form, 
one includes climate change effects in utility, and the other changes traditional free 
trade areas and Customs Unions to carbon motivated free trade areas and Customs 
Unions. In carbon free trade agreements, traditional zero-tariffs on all goods changes 
to structural preferential trade policies setting high tariffs on high carbon intensive 
products and zero tariffs on low carbon intensive goods. We also consider a new form 
of carbon motivated Customs Unions of only setting zero tariffs on low carbon 
intensive goods.   - 7 - 
We argue that agreements with lower within region barriers on low carbon 
intensive products need not reduce emissions globally if emissions intensities of 
production differ sharply within and outside the region. This reflects the differential 
impact of trade creation and trade diversion on emissions. We also note that unlike 
conventional customs union literature the welfare effects of a regional agreement also 
include welfare impacts on climate change from emissions changes. 
2.2   The Model 
   We present our carbon free trade area model in algebraic form. In its simplest 
form, there are three regions, i=1,2,3,where regions 1 and 2 form a carbon free trade 
agreement, although in empirical implementation we can consider more regions. 
There are two goods, j=1,2, in production, good 1 has high energy intensity, and good 
2 has low energy intensity. The model specifies two factors, N a non-energy input, 
which is immobile across countries, but mobile across sectors within a country, and E 
an energy input which is mobile across both countries and sectors. 
On the production side, we consider a two sectors (a high emission good and a 
low emissions good), two factors (energy and non energy inputs) structure. We 
assume production is CES. The production function for each good in each country can 

























σ   i=country, j=sector    (1) 
where  ij Y is the output of good j produced in country i, E p is the price of energy, 
ij σ is the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs. We assume that energy is 
mobile across countries, so that the energy price in each country (the world price) is 
the same. iN p is the price of the non-energy input in country i, goods prices are ij P . 
      First order conditions imply the following: 
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      Unlike traditional general equilibrium models which use a fixed endowment of 
energy, here, by introducing an extraction cost function for each country into the 
model, energy supply now is endogenously determined. 
        The extraction cost function can be written as   
            
3
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where  i K is the extraction cost in country i, and  i Q   is energy extraction in countryi. 
We assume the energy market is perfectly competitive, and from the first-order 
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and the energy supply elasticity is   
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Dividing the extraction cost function by the energy price, we can calculate the 
resources that are used in energy extraction. 
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   The  utility  function  is   
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This utility function follows Cai, Riezman & Whalley (2009). i RX is composite 
consumption,  T Δ  is temperature change. In this specification ,C can be thought of 
as the global temperature change at which all economic activity ceases (say, 20℃). In 
this case, as  T Δ  approaches C, utility goes to zero. In this form, as  T Δ  goes to 
zero, there is no welfare impact of temperature change.   
For the final good demand functions,  i RX  is a two level nested CES function. 
Each region is assumed to maximize utility by first choosing among high and low - 9 - 
emission goods, and each region then chooses using among domestic goods and the 
other country goods at a second level. 
         11 21 1 2 (,, , ) ii i i r i r RX f X X X X = L                           (10) 
Each of the four regions maximizes top level utility subject to a budget 
constraint. i I is income in country  i.  
         i
i j
i ij i ij I X P = ∑
′
′ ′                                         ( 1 1 )  
        income includes non-energy income, energy income, tariff revenue, and transfers 
from abroad (financing net goods import and net energy import). 
 [] ii N i N E ii i i Ip W p Q KR T R =+ − + +                         ( 1 2 )  
       For country i, iN p is the price of non-energy input, iN W is the non-energy 
endowment, i K is the extraction cost of energy, and  i Q is energy extraction in 
country i. i R   is tariff revenue, and  i TR   are exogenous transfers between countries 
(net goods import plus net energy import). These can be zero, but incorporating 
them allows calibration to unbalanced trade data.   
            Figure 1 shows the structure of two level nested CES utility functions used. 
  For each good j produced in country i’, we can define the seller’s price (net of 
tariff) as i j p ′, and allow each country i to impose tariffs at rate  iji t ′  (  countryi’s tariff 
on good  j  imported  from  country i′) on each imported good. Tariffs are set to zero 
for exports. Internal (gross of tariff ) prices for good j produced in country i’ are thus 
     ' [1 ] iji ji iji P tP ′′ =+                                        ( 1 3 )  
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        Temperature change in physical form is assumed to be a function of energy 
consumption, ie 
        ∑ ∑ + = = Δ c E a E g T
b
ij ij ) ( ) (                            (14) 
      In equilibrium, goods and factor markets clear. Goods market clearing implies:   
j i
i
i ij Y X ′ ′ = ∑   i=1,2,3 ,  j = 1 , 2                            ( 1 5 )  
        Non-energy is only mobile across sectors within regions and immobile across 
regions, so each region’s non-energy consumption equals its non-energy endowment. 
The non-energy clearing condition is: 
iN
j
ij W N = ∑   i= 1 , 2 , 3                                   ( 1 6 )                
      Energy is mobile across countries and so global energy consumption equals global 
energy extraction. The energy clearing condition is:     
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Final Demand Functions 
In each region, a 2 level CES 
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domestic and import 
goods  
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CES Hierarchy 
Consumption  Temperature 
change
M 2  M 3  D  M 2  M 3  D 
Figure 1 : Two Level Nested CES Utility Functions Used for Each Country 
M 1  M 1 - 11 - 
3.   Data  and  Parameterization 
We build a model compatible benchmark general equilibrium data set which we 
use in calibration. Our base case assumes a single 30 year period, forward projecting a 
business as usual scenario for trade, production, and consumption data (as well as 
energy use) for a 2 good (energy / non energy intensive), 2 factor (energy inputs, 
other inputs) structure for 4 regions (China, US , EU, ROW). We forward project 
2006 data using 2004-2006 average growth rates, for the period 2006-2036.   
   In Table 1-1 GDP data is from the World Bank’s WDI database. The high- 
emission sector reflects manufacturing industry. The low-emission sector includes 
service and agricultural sectors. For Table 1-2, trade data is taken from the 
UNCOMTRADE database,  F.o.b. export values as reported by exporting countries 
are used. Since data on EU’s exports to China and US in 2006 were not available at 
the time of model execution, we use the import data of China and the US from the EU 
instead. Since China’s growth rates is high relative to other regions ,to keep trade 
balance in the data, we use China’s growth rate for China’s imports and exports , 
while for other data , we use the import country’s growth rate in our projections, tariff 
data is from the WTO Statistical Database. 
          In Table 1-3 , energy data for 2005 is calculated from IEA energy statistics. The 
unit of account of the IEA statistics data is thousand of tonnes of oil equivalent, which 
we adjust to billion US dollars, (1 toe=7.33 barrel of oil equivalent, oil price 
(average)=$ 50.64/per barrel) . In 2005, the energy balances for world were crude oil 
imports of 4476208 Ktoe, while exports were 4484919 Ktoe, comparable with world 
crude oil trade balance. The extraction cost is calculated using the IEA trade balance 
table.  
        In the data presented in Table 1-4 , adjustments are made to consumption by 
calculating GDP minus exports. There are also some small differences in goods 
classifications between the underlying consumption, production and tariff rate data. 
Table 1-5 gives energy consumption data from IEA statistics. 
 - 12 - 
Table 1    Data Sources in Model Calibration 
Table 1-1    2006-2036 GDP by Sector by Region    (Billion $) 
 China  EU-27  US  ROW 
  High  Low      High  Low      High  Low      High  Low 
GDP by sector    250634.94 270111.98 171324.82 475585.94 156507.52 528727.91  331566.87 785626.32 
GDP   520746.92 646910.76 685235.43 1117193.19 
Source: World Bank’s WDI database 




China         EU-27  US  ROW  World 
China 
High 0.00  31162.09  27276.87  77626.04    136065.00 
Low 0.00  16736.03  12652.93  24385.00    53773.96 
Total 0.00  47898.12  39929.80  102011.04    189838.96 
EU-27 
High 12539.29  0.00 13998.92  48345.62    74883.83 
Low 2995.71  0.00  3426.20  15622.03    22043.94 
Total 15535.00  0.00 17425.12  63967.65    96927.77 
US 
High 6922.08  7094.06  0.00  35001.03    49017.17 
Low 3896.98  2651.82  0.00  11664.97    18213.77 
Total 10819.06  9745.88  0.00  46666.00    67230.94 
ROW 
High 101830.79  41001.21  54236.77 0.00    197068.77 
Low 26883.06  13880.83  17620.85  0.00    58384.74 
Total 128713.85  54882.04  71857.62 0.00    255453.51 
World 
High 121292.16  79257.36  95512.56  160972.69    457034.77 
Low 33775.75  33268.68  33699.98  51672.00    152416.41 
Total 155067.91  112526.04 129212.54  212644.69    609451.18 
Source: UNCOMTRADE database 
Table  1-3  2006-2036  Energy  Balance  Data  (Billion  $) 
  Extrac- 
tion  Import Export Net 
Import 
Extraction 







China  105558.07   13355.00   -6073.65  7281.34  -31929.23   80910.18    42907.78    38002.40  
Eu27  6365.47   24024.08   -7869.24  16154.84  -1009.94   21510.37    11309.85    10200.52  
US  21873.33   16281.39   -2082.20  14199.19  -5193.87   30878.64    18087.44    12791.21  
ROW  137722.08   45302.26   -82937.63  -37635.37  -11553.34   88533.37    46889.71    41643.66  
World  271518.94   98962.72   -98962.72  0.00  -49686.38  221832.57   119194.77   102637.79  
Source: IEA energy statistics 
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Table 1-4 : Consumption of Domestic Goods (2006-2036) (Billion $) 
  Consumption of domestic goods 
High energy   
intensity goods 
Low energy   
intensity goods 
China  114569.94 216338.02 
EU-27  96440.99 453542.00 
US  107490.35 510514.14 
ROW  134498.10 727241.58 
 
 
Table 1-5    Energy Consumption (Billion US $) 
Year China  EU-27  US  ROW  World 
2006  412.96   483.69   593.20   1446.90   2936.75  
2036  80910.18   21510.37   30878.64   88533.37   221832.56  
2056  612633.64   47336.00   76757.82   250518.18   987245.64  
Source: International Energy Agency: Key World Energy Statistics, 2008. 
 
As for elasticities, in the central case , model analyses elasticity parameters are 
used as follows: for all countries the production elasticity is 0.5, the extraction / 
energy supply elasticity is 0.5, the consumption elasticity, that is the substitution 
elasticity between high and low emission goods in consumption is equal to 0.5, and 
the trade elasticity ,that is the substitution elasticity between domestic and imported 
goods is equal to 2. The substitution elasticities between domestic and imported 
commodities follows the “rule of two”, as discussed in Hertel al. (2009). This rule 
was first proposed by Jomini et al.(1991) and later tested by Liu, Arndt,and 
Hertel(2002) in a back-casting exercise with a simplified version of the GTAP model. 
The model Global 2100 uses a capital and labour nest against energy with a 
substitution elasticity of 0.4 (see Manne and Richels, 1992), Kemfert(1998) studied 
the case of Germany, and the substitution elasticities in all sectors between composite 
of capital and labor , trading off against energy was 0.458. We thus use the setting of 
0.5 as the substitution elasticity between energy and non-energy inputs. 
 
 - 14 - 
Using the data for 2006,2036, and 2056 in table 1-5, and assuming the 
temperature change at these three points to be 0℃,2℃, and 5℃ respectively, we can 
solve for the values of parameters a,b,and c in equation (14) as 
  c a + =
b 2936.75) - 2936.75 ( 0  
c a + =
b 221832.56) ( 2 
c a + =
b )   987245.64 ( 5 
    Solving these equations for the parameters a,b,and c yields values of 0.0010,     
0.6137 and 0. Substituting these values in the temperature equation yields 
                        ∑ ∑ = = Δ
0.6137 ) ( 0.001 ) ( ij ij E E g T           ( 1 8 )  
   Assuming a temperature change  T Δ of 5℃ between 2006 and 2056 (consistent 
with Stern(2002)), Table 2 reports the calibrated preference parameters in equation (9) 
under alternative damage assumptions. If we assumed half temperature change, at 
these three points to be 0℃,1℃, and 2.5℃ respectively, we can solve for the values 
of parameters a,b,and c, 0.0005, 0.6137 and 0. If we double temperature change, 
temperature change at these three points will be 0℃,4℃, and 10℃ respectively, and 
the values of parameters a,b,and c are 0.0021 , 0.6137, and 0 .   
 The specification C can be thought of the global temperature change at which all 
economic activity ceases (say 20℃). In this case, as T Δ approaches C utility goes to 
zero. In this form , as T Δ goes to zero there is no welfare impact of temperature 
change. As discussed in Cai et al.(2009), the share parameter  β  reflects the assumed 
severity of damage from temperature change, which we later (in Table 7) calibrate to 
various damage estimates from business as usual global temperature change scenarios 
reported by Stern(2006) and Mendelson(2007). 
Table 2 also reports remaining parameter values in production, preferences and 
extraction cost functions generated by calibration. These are independent of the 
assumed utility damage due to temperature change. - 15 - 
Table 2    Calibrated Parameters under Alternative Damage Assumptions 
 
A．  Assumed Changes in Preference Parameters 
Assumed Utility Loss  Utility Relative to No damage          β  
1%  0.99         0.0349 
1.5%  0.985         0.0525 
3% 0.97      0.1059 
5% 0.95      0.1783 
6% 0.94      0.2151 
10% 0.90      0.3662 
15% 0.85      0.5649 
20% 0.80      0.7757 
B． Parameters  in  CES  production functions 




























1.39621179  1.31890362 1.14065722 1.04381582 1.25695383 1.04955396  1.32072255 1.11159828
shares on 
energy   
0.20228798  0.16157483 0.07050406 0.02191317 0.12956913 0.02478459  0.16252202 0.05588649
shares on 
non-energy   0.97932608  0.98686046 0.99751149 0.99975988 0.99157039 0.99969281  0.98670492 0.99843713
C.    Parameters in Nested CES Utility functions 
  China EU  US ROW 
Shares of consumption of high emission domestic and import goods 
China-H  0.14174185 0.05360871 0.03921093 0.07263893 
EU-H  0.01843119 0.15398406 0.02012367 0.04523964 
US-H  0.01017459 0.01220404 0.14508505 0.03275238 
ROW-H  0.14967854  0.07053513 0.0779662 0.11344204 
Shares of consumption of low emission domestic and import goods 
China-L  0.34606345  0.02140224  0.01314736  0.01844225 
EU-L  0.00642599  0.4385596  0.00356008  0.01181486 
US-L  0.00835927  0.00339118  0.47659601  0.00882215 
ROW-L  0.05766585  0.01775098  0.01830941  0.43768184 
  China  EU  US  ROW 


























  0.64095368  0.76757956 0.27094705 0.96259425 0.26848974 0.96328254  0.27433175 0.96163511
D.  Parameters  in  Extraction functions 
Constant 
Parameter 
-38442.80  -3233.71  -9388.35  -80261.40 
Coefficient 
parameter  0.00205193  0.00835591  0.00450766  0.00179642 - 16 - 
4 .    Model Experiments and Results for Carbon Motivated Regional 
Trade Agreements 
    We have used our calibrated model to simulate the impacts of carbon motivated 
regional trade agreements on emissions and welfare. Following Dong & Whalley 
(2008), we analyze the first type of carbon motivated regional agreement (lower 
tariffs on low carbon intensive goods) and the third types of carbon motivated 
regional agreements(added penalties on third parties). Results are presented in Table 3 
to Table 8.   
    These experiments confirmed the conjectures in our previous policy paper (see 
Dong & Whalley (2008)), that while carbon motivated regional agreements can 
reduce global carbon emissions, the effect on carbon emissions is small. Carbon 
motivated regional agreements may increase world welfare, but the effects on 
participating countries may be negative or positive. When we consider third party 
penalties, the effects of carbon motivated trade policies on carbon emissions are still 
small. Even though carbon motivated regional agreements will have larger effects on 
emissions when high and low emissions countries are involved compared to more 
uniform emissions levels, the effects are still small. 
In Tables 3,4,5, using central case model specifications, we analyze four 
groupings of regional trade agreements, these are EU-US, EU-China, US-China, and 
EU-US-China. In each group, there are two sub forms. One is carbon free trade 
agreements, which eliminates interior tariffs on low carbon intensive goods, and keep 
tariffs on high carbon intensive goods unchanged. The other is carbon motivated 
customs unions, besides within region tariff reductions as in carbon free trade 
agreements, we assume a common 5% external tariff on low carbon motivated goods. 
Totally we analyze eight kinds of carbon motivated regional trade agreements in our 
central case analyses. 
Table 3 reports the impacts of carbon motivated trade arrangements on welfare 
and emissions. Most carbon motivated trade arrangements will reduce global 
emissions, but the effect is small. In Table 3-1, the global emissions are reduced in 
seven cases; the exception being in the US-China carbon CU case. The biggest 
reduction is from a EU-US-China carbon FTA, -0.0221% (very small change), and 
smallest reduction is from a EU-US carbon FTA, -0.0008%, Since China has much - 17 - 
higher emissions intensity than the EU or the US, the carbon FTAs that involve China 
will have larger effects.   
We can also compare carbon FTAs and carbon CUs. In case 1 and case 4, 
EU-US, EU-US-China, since China and ROW are respectively outside the agreement 
and both of these two regions have a higher emission intensity than the insiders 
(measured in average emissions intensity across sectors), carbon CUs has more 
impact than carbon FTAs in these two scenarios. In cases 2 and 3, EU-China, 
US-China, the outside countries have lower emissions levels than insiders (average 
level). In this case carbon FTAs have more impacts on emissions than a carbon CU. A   
carbon CU has a larger role than a carbon FTA in reducing carbon emissions when 
the outsider has higher emission intensity than insiders. 
Table 3-1 also reports separate effects on country’s emissions. The EU increases 
emissions in most cases, since EU’s carbon intensity is low, and increased trade 
increases production in other member countries who have a relative higher carbon 
intensity. For China, participating in the carbon free trade areas will decrease China’s 
carbon emissions, such that EU-China carbon FTA, US-China carbon FTA , 
EU-US-China FTA will decrease China’s emissions 0.0227%, 0.0002%, 0.0202%.  
For US, in most cases, participating in carbon FTAs and CUs will reduce it’s carbon 
emissions. 
    In Table 3-2, for welfare analysis, we use Hicksian CV and EV measures 
c a p t u r i n g   t h e   e f f e c t s   o f   t e m p e r a t u r e   c h a n g e .                          
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        In Table 3-2, since the temperature change is small,  01 TT Δ ≈Δ , and CV and EV 
measures from equations (19) and (20) are similar. We only focus on the CV measure. 
For the global economy, in most cases (except a US-China carbon FTA), carbon 
motivated regional trade agreements are welfare improving. And comparing carbon 
FTA and CU, in case 1, since the outsider has higher carbon emissions, the total 
welfare increase is small, for a EU-US FTA, when reducing the tariff on outsider’s 
low carbon goods to a 5% CET , A EU-US CU however, seems to improve global - 18 - 
welfare more. In cases 2,3 and 4, the high emission country China is involved in the 
carbon arrangement, so a carbon CU is more powerful than carbon FTAs in increasing 
global welfare. For insiders, in EU-US FTA/CU, EU-China FTA/CU , EU-US-China 
FTA/EU, the EU will benefit most from these arrangements, in US-China CU, China 
will benefit most. For outsiders, in all cases, outsiders increase welfare in carbon 




Table 3-1    Impacts of Carbon Motivated Trade Agreements on Emissions(Energy Use) 
(% Change Based on 2006 Data) 
 Carbon  FTA/CU 
% Change in Emissions 
China EU US Row Total 
1 
EU-US FTA  0.0029% 0.0102% -0.0266% 0.0013% -0.0008% 
EU-US CU ( 5 % CET)  -0.0123% 0.1761% -0.0019% -0.0711% -0.0162% 
2 
EU-China FTA  -0.0227% 0.1342%  0.0437% -0.0715% -0.0186% 
EU-China CU( 5 % CET)  0.0174%  0.1576% -0.0975% -0.0509% -0.0090% 
3 
US-China FTA  -0.0002% 0.0063% -0.0069% -0.0067% -0.0027% 
US-China CU (5 % CET)  0.0311% -0.0695% -0.0627% 0.0268%  0.0103% 
4 
EU-US-China FTA  -0.0202% 0.1509%  0.0114% -0.0771% -0.0221% 
EU-US-China CU ( 5 % CET)  0.0108%  0.1591% -0.0569% -0.0695% -0.0130% 
 





Table 3-2    Impacts of Carbon Motivated Trade Agreements on Welfare ( in billion $) 
 
Carbon FTA 
Change in Welfare by Region (CV)  Change in Welfare by Region (EV) 
China EU  US  Row Total  China EU  US  Row Total 
EU-US FTA  10.672797  151.197951  -178.789555 19.304016 2.385208 10.672797  151.197963  -178.789570 19.304018 2.385209 
EU-US CU ( 5 % CET)  -952.283340 2299.904447  -18.192248  -656.740161  672.688698  -952.284389 2299.906981  -18.192268  -656.740884  672.689439 
EU-China FTA  -1337.797145 1459.422417  25.368077  605.296458  752.289807 -1337.798767 1459.424187  25.368107  605.297192  752.290720 
EU-China CU( 5 % CET)  543.544092 2753.094287 -323.619967 -2816.767173  156.251240  543.544548 2753.096597 -323.620239 -2816.769536  156.251371 
US-China FTA  -81.774228 9.803609 7.074769  127.446919  62.551069  -81.774246 9.803611 7.074771  127.446946  62.551082 
US-China CU (5 % CET)  1716.633303 -108.648317  179.396058 -2375.405951 -588.024906  1716.632540 -108.648269  179.395979 -2375.404894 -588.024644 
EU-US-China FTA  -1414.416407 1621.737205 -137.351419  751.945956  821.915336 -1414.418537 1621.739647 -137.351625  751.947088  821.916573 
EU-US-China CU ( 5 % CET)  243.189927 2734.294852  63.773936 -2705.995800  335.262914  243.190199 2734.297920  63.774007 -2705.998836  335.263290 
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   In Table 4, we compare the welfare effects of carbon based regional trade 
agreements and traditional trade agreements, also calibrating a non climate change 
traditional trade model to the same trade, production and consumption data for 
2006-2036. This allows us to compare the welfare impacts of similar tariff 
arrangements with and without climate change considerations. There are four country 
cases where the sign change from a negative CV (in traditional carbon regional 
agreements) to a positive CV (in carbon based regional agreement). The four cases 
are: in EU-US FTA, the welfare of EU, and total welfare, in US-China CU, the 
welfare of US and in EU-US-China CU, the welfare of China. That suggests carbon 
motivated regional trade agreements increase welfare for participating countries over 
conventional regional agreements. 
In Table 4, comparing impacts on total welfare, in most cases, carbon motivated 
regional trade agreements reduce welfare compared to traditional regional trade 
agreements. In the 6 cases(all except EU-US FTA/ CU) ,since these carbon regional 
trade agreements have no tariff preferences towards high energy intensive goods, 
which will reduce the consumption of such kind of goods, the negative consumption 
effect is bigger than the positive temperature effect, so the total welfare effect is 
negative. 
In Table 4, we also consider the welfare change of individual countries, and for 
the ROW. All 8 cases show welfare reductions under a carbon regional trade 
agreements compared to traditional trade agreements which means that carbon 
motivated regional trade agreements offer more incentives for the outsiders to join 
environmental trade agreements. For China, only under a EU-US FTA/CU does 
China’s welfare reduce under carbon free trade agreements. For EU, as an outsider the 
EU faces losses in US-China carbon regional trade agreements compared to 
traditional trade agreements. But when considering US , there is some change in 
EU-US FTA/EU cases where the US loses in carbon agreements compared to 







Table 4    Comparing Conventional CU / FTA Analysis and Carbon Based Regional Trade Agreement Analysis(billion $) 
 
Carbon FTA/CU 
Carbon Based Regional Agreement   
Analysis : Change in Welfare by Region (CV) 
Conventional Regional Agreements 
  Analysis : Change in Welfare by Region (EV) 
China   EU  US  Row  Total  China   EU  US  Row  Total 
EU-US FTA  10.672797  151.197951  -178.789555 19.304016 2.385208 63.895291  -24.256359  -171.007329  106.121569  -25.246827 
EU-US CU ( 5 % CET)  -952.283340  2299.904447 -18.192248 -656.740161 672.688698 -897.757238  2122.934557 -11.926031 -568.811030 644.440258 
EU-China FTA  -1337.797145 1459.422417  25.368077  605.296458  752.289807 -1583.533067 1216.959514  60.438650  1164.303098  858.168195 
EU-China CU( 5 % CET)  543.544092 2753.094287 -323.619967 -2816.767173  156.251240  294.330273 2497.693855 -287.134231 -2240.576825  264.313073 
US-China FTA  -81.774228  9.803609  7.074769 127.446919 62.551069  -349.715881 51.949010  -51.645805 531.011861  181.599184 
US-China CU (5 % CET)  1716.633303 -108.648317  179.396058 -2375.405951 -588.024906  1445.527652  -65.896454  113.499567 -1961.025906 -467.895142 
EU-US-China FTA  -1414.416407 1621.737205 -137.351419  751.945956  821.915336 -1879.439131 1252.433868 -140.989771  1794.158006 1026.162972 
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      In Table 5 , we analyze the impacts of carbon based regional trade agreements on 
trade flows and production. In nearly all eight cases, carbon FTA/CU will increase 
insider’s imports, except in the case of EU-China carbon FTA for China, and the 
EU-US-China FTA for China. For outsiders the results are that carbon FTAs will 
increase outsider’s imports, but a carbon CU (5% CET) will reduce outsider’s 
imports. 
      Table 5 also reports the impacts on production in nearly all cases. China, US, Row 
increase low energy intensive goods, production, and reduce high energy intensive 
goods production, except in an EU-US FTA(China production), a US-China CU 
(China ,ROW Production), a EU-China FTA(US production). As for the EU, except 
for US-China a FTA/CU increases low energy intensive goods production, and 
reduces high energy intensive goods production. In all other cases ,the EU reduces 
low energy intensive goods production and increases high energy intensive goods 
production. That means that high emission countries will tend to produce more low 
energy intensive goods, and less high energy intensive goods, no matter whether they 
are outsiders or insiders. For a low emission country (EU), when it is an outsider, it 
will tend to produce more low energy intensive goods, and less high energy intensive 
goods, and when it is an insider, vice versa. That means if carbon regional trade 
agreements are signed between high emission countries, it will be more forceful in 






Table 5    Impacts of Carbon Based Regional Trade Agreements on Trade Flows and Production 
 
 
% Change in Value of Imports 
%  Change  in  Production 
Emissions intensive good  Emissions non intensive good 
China    EU US  Row  China    EU US  Row  China    EU US  Row 
EU-US FTA  0.0115%  0.7663%  0.1901%  0.0068%  0.0035%  0.0213% -0.0612% -0.0032% -0.0023% -0.0072%  0.0166%  0.0015% 
EU-US CU ( 5 % CET)  -1.0611%  6.7985%  0.4708% -0.2257% -0.4318%  0.3886% -0.0755% -0.3010%  0.3970% -0.1320%  0.0223%  0.1190% 
EU-China FTA  -0.9654% 5.1045% 0.0170% 0.2108%  -0.5591% 0.2633% 0.0132%  -0.3120% 0.5120%  -0.0888%  -0.0013% 0.1236% 
EU-China CU( 5 % CET)  4.4944%  8.4233% -0.1449% -0.9729% -0.0869%  0.3607% -0.2599% -0.2200%  0.0859% -0.1228%  0.0713%  0.0871% 
US-China FTA  0.5988% 0.0070% 1.0070% 0.0443%  -0.0633%  -0.0012%  -0.0282%  -0.0381% 0.0587% 0.0007% 0.0080% 0.0153% 
US-China CU (5 % CET)  5.9092% -0.0622%  1.2241% -0.8219%  0.4138% -0.1522% -0.1029%  0.1165% -0.3746%  0.0517%  0.0268% -0.0461% 
EU-US-China FTA  -0.3775% 5.8723% 1.2164% 0.2619%  -0.6206% 0.2837%  -0.0736%  -0.3539% 0.5699%  -0.0954% 0.0225% 0.1407% 
EU-US-China CU 
 (5  %  CET)  4.3890%  8.6714%  1.4253% -0.9342% -0.2271%  0.3403% -0.1924% -0.2980%  0.2140% -0.1154%  0.0537%  0.1179% - 24 - 
   In Table 6-1, we report sensitivity results for elasticities and other key model 
parameters for carbon based regional trade agreements analysis. If we choose the case 
of a EU-US-China carbon FTA, decreasing trade elasticities increases the global 
emissions impact of the agreement. The outsider increases emissions, and for the 
insider, China emissions increases, while EU and US reduce emissions. Decreasing 
production elasticities, all insiders will reduce emissions, but for outsiders, the result 
is not clear. Reducing extraction elasticities, all regions increase emissions. With a 
combined reduction of trade elasticities, production elasticities and extractions 
elasticities together, total emissions increase, and outsiders still increase emissions, 
and for the insiders, EU and US emissions fall while the China increases emissions. 
   In Table 6-2, when considering welfare inputs, lower trade elasticities will 
increase all regions welfare impacts, and a fall in production elasticities increases the 
welfare of EU,US and ROW and decreases the welfare of the China and total welfare. 
Also a fall in extraction elasticities will increase the welfare of EU, US, Row, and 
decrease the welfare of the China and total welfare. With a combined reduction of 
trade elasticities, production elasticities and extractions elasticities together, all 
regions welfare impacts of trade agreements will increase. 
 
Table 6-1    Sensitivity of Carbon Based Regional Trade Agreements Analysis to Elasticities 
  and Other Key Model Parameters (% change based on 2005 data) 
 
EU-US-China FTA 
% Change in emissions 
  China   EU  US  Row  Total 
1.  Base Case ( Table 3-1)       
2  1.5 trade elasticities in all regions  -0.0146%  0.1146%  0.0084% -0.0405% -0.0105% 
3  Half trade elasticities in all regions  0.0133%  -0.0993%  -0.0105% 0.0357% 0.0092% 
4  Double production substitution elasticities in all 
regions 
0.0112% 0.0958% 0.1412%  -0.0721% 0.0065% 
5  Half production substitution elasticities in all 
regions 
-0.0114% -0.0126% -0.0108% -0.0113% -0.0114% 
6  Double the extractions elasticities in all regions  -0.0081% -0.0078% -0.0080% -0.0081% -0.0081% 
7  Half the extractions elasticities in all regions  0.0001% 0.0001% 0.0001% 0.0001% 0.0001% 
8  2,4, and 6 together  -0.0115%  0.1222%  0.0142% -0.0394% -0.0074% 
9  3,5,and  7  together  0.0061%  -0.1068%  -0.0172% 0.0286% 0.0020% 




Table 6-2    Sensitivity of Carbon Based Regional Trade Agreements Analysis to Elasticities 
  and Other Key Model Parameters (billion $) 
 
EU-US-China FTA  CV EV   
China    EU US Row  Total  China    EU US Row  Total 
1  Base Case ( Table 3-2) 
             
2  1.5 trade elasticities in all regions  -11884.33 -33674.22 -39881.21 -52711.38 -138151.13 -11884.33 -33674.24 -39881.23 -52711.41 -138151.22 
3  Half trade elasticities in all regions  28332.00 81356.55 90683.11  130990.17 331361.84 28331.99 81356.51 90683.07  130990.10 331361.66 
4  Double production substitution 
elasticities in all regions 
-15.79  200.32 -1053.23  -327.36  -1196.06  -15.79  200.32 -1053.23  -327.36  -1196.06 
5  Half production substitution 
elasticities in all regions 
-8.29 4.24 1.41 0.51  -2.12  -8.29 4.24 1.41 0.51  -2.12 
6  Double the extractions elasticities in 
all regions 
0.39 -1.72 -1.31 -2.12  -4.76  0.39 -1.72 -1.31 -2.12  -4.76 
7  Half the extractions elasticities in 
all regions 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
8  2,4, and 6 together  -11876.01 -33683.83 -39885.16 -52703.61 -138148.61 -11876.02 -33683.84 -39885.17 -52703.63 -138148.66 







Table 7    Sensitivity of Results to Key Parameters in the Environmental Component of Modeling Structure (billion $) 
 
    EU-US-China FTA (CV)  EU- China FTA( CV) 
  China   EU  US  Row  Total  China    EU  US Row Total 
1 Base  Case   
( Table 3-2)  473.88  997.74 1162.91 1549.24  4183.77  476.42  1003.10 1169.15 1557.56  4206.24 
2  Halve damage estimated to 
calibrate preferences towards 
temperature change 
-977.00  -2057.01 -2397.68 -3193.98  -8625.67  -966.35  -2034.60 -2371.56 -3159.18  -8531.70 
3 Double  damage  estimated  to 
calibrate preferences towards 
temperature change 
481.65  1014.14 1181.90 1574.53  4252.22  484.28  1019.68 1188.36 1583.13  4275.44 
4  Halve temperature change for 
BAU scenario  -1166.54 -104853.31 -2862.82 -3813.58 -112696.25 -1151.40 -103492.22 -2825.66 -3764.08 -111233.35 
5  Double temperature change for 
BAU scenario  473.88  997.74 1162.91 1549.24  4183.77  476.42  1003.10 1169.15 1557.56  4206.24 
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Table 7 reports sensitivity analysis of key parameters in the environmental 
component of the modeling structure. We choose two cases, EU-US-China FTA and 
EU-China FTA, both cases show that if we increase damage cost estimates, the 
welfare impacts will increase. And also if we increase temperature change,the welfare 
impacts of agreements will increase with increasing temperature change. 
In Table 8 ,we analyze the impacts of carbon based regional trade agreements on 
emissions and welfare with trade penalties on third parties. Results show that 
increasing penalties on outsiders effectively decreases the emissions of outsiders, but 
increase the emission of insiders, and also increase the world total emissions. The 
EU-US FTA involves zero tariff on low emission goods, increasing domestic 
production (and consumption) of high emission goods. Imports from China of high 
emission goods fall, and emissions rise in the EU and the US. Interestingly, there are 
peaks for the implied emissions reduction as a function of external penalty rates, 
suggesting an optimal external tariff in terms of maximizing emissions reduction. 
 
Table 8    Impacts on Emissions of Carbon Based Regional Trade Agreements   




% Change in Emissions 
   China    EU  US  Row  Total 
1  FTA without penalty  0.0029%  0.0102%  -0.0266%  0.0013%  -0.0008% 
2  15% external rate on high emission goods  -0.1525%  1.4337%  2.0618%  -1.0050%  -0.0352% 
3  30% external rate on high emission goods  -0.3410%  3.0118%  4.3096%  -2.0372%  -0.0619% 
4  50% external rate on high emission goods  -0.5672%  4.7040%  6.7504%  -3.0804%  -0.0772% 
5  100% external rate on high emission goods  -1.0188%  7.6370%  11.0573%  -4.7278%  -0.0690% 
6  150% external rate on high emission goods  -1.3469%  9.5141%  13.8655%  -5.6696%  -0.0385% 
7  200% external rate on high emission goods  -1.5919%  10.8182%  15.8405%  -6.2688%  -0.0042% 
8  15% external rate on all goods  -0.1325%  1.4400%  1.8748%  -0.9476%  -0.0299% 
9  30% external rate on all goods  -0.2756%  2.8010%  3.8395%  -1.8232%  -0.0358% 
10  50% external rate on all goods  -0.4518%  4.2468%  5.9622%  -2.7089%  -0.0342% 
11  100% external rate on all goods  -0.8130%  6.7303%  9.6934%  -4.1116%  -0.0093% 
12  150% external rate on all goods  -1.0810%  8.3110%  12.1237%  -4.9175%  0.0243% 
13  200% external rate on all goods  -1.2836%  9.4075%  13.8343%  -5.4330%  0.0572% 
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5.   Concluding  Remarks 
We build on an earlier policy piece by Dong & Whalley(2008) and develop a 
multi-region general equilibrium model calibrated to a single period data set reflecting 
a business as usual scenario between 2006 and 2036. We use this to evaluate the 
impacts of both carbon motivated free trade agreements and customs unions on trade, 
emissions and welfare. Our results confirm the widely held view that as a mechanism 
for reducing carbon emissions trade policy would seem to only offer quantitatively 
small and indirect effects, since it is economic growth more so than trade and its 
composition that seemingly fuels growing emissions. 
Results from model analysis show that carbon motivated trade arrangements may 
reduce global carbon emissions. And as conjectured by Dong & Whalley(2008), the 
effect of such agreements on emissions are relatively small comparing carbon FTAs 
and carbon CU, carbon CUs seem more powerful than carbon FTAs in terms of  
emissions impacts when outsiders have higher emission intensities than insiders. 
For welfare analysis , most carbon RTAs are welfare improving. When including 
high emission countries in the agreements, carbon based CUs are more effective than 
carbon FTAs. Comparing carbon RTAs to traditional RTAs, since carbon RTAs do 
not eliminate tariffs on high emission goods, the negative consumption effect is 
bigger than the positive temperature effects, so the total welfare effect is negative. 
Carbon RTAs also give a much bigger incentive than traditional RTAs for the 
outsider to join agreements. In most cases, carbon based RTAs will increase insider’s 
imports, For outsiders , the impacts on imports are unclear: carbon based RTAs will 
increase the production of low energy intensive goods, and reduce the production of 
high energy intensive goods; Finally even with trade penalties on third parties there 
are still not large effects in terms of carbon emissions reductions 
As the global debate on a new Post 2012 climate change regime moves forward 
to the 2009 Copenhagen UNFCCC negotiation, trade and climate issues will likely 
link prominently. These results seemingly support the general argument that as a way 
of addressing climate change, trade policy has only small impacts. 
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